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ECONOMIC RATIONALITY AND ETHICAL VALUES IN 
DESIGN-DEFECT ANALYSIS:  THE TROLLEY PROBLEM AND 
AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES 
W. BRADLEY WENDEL* 
I. INTRODUCTION: MACHINE ETHICS AND THE TROLLEY PROBLEM 
In the future with self-driving cars, the sensors and software of an 
autonomous vehicle may be confronted by a dilemma: crash into a 
telephone pole, killing the driver, or swerve into a crowd, killing five 
people.  This may sound familiar if you have taken an introductory 
ethics class.  Ethics teachers are fond of using the so-called trolley 
problem, introduced by Philippa Foot and further developed by Judith 
Jarvis Thomson,1 to illustrate the difference between consequentialist 
and deontological moral theories.  Moral theorists have used the trolley 
problem to explore subtle issues including the nature of intention, the 
doctrine of double effect (Foot’s original use of the thought 
experiment), the act/omission distinction, agent-relative versus agent-
neutral duties, moral agency and “authorship” of wrongs, and the 
problem of moral luck.2  In the original version of the problem, the 
reader envisions herself in charge of a switch on a railroad track.  A 
runaway trolley hurtles down the track, which, if left as is, will result in 
                                                          
       *      Professor of Law, Cornell University.  The author gratefully acknowledges 
the research funding provided by the Judge Albert Conway Memorial Fund for Legal 
Research, established by the William C. and Joyce C. O’Neil Charitable Trust.  
1.  See PHILIPPA FOOT, The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double 
Effect, in VIRTUES AND VICES 19 (1978); Judith Jarvis Thomson, Killing, Letting Die, 
and the Trolley Problem, in RIGHTS, RESTITUTION, AND RISK: ESSAYS IN MORAL 
THEORY 78 (William Parent ed., 1986); Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Trolley Problem, 
in RIGHTS, RESTITUTION, AND RISK, supra, at 94. 
2.  See, e.g., Michael Gorr, Thomson and the Trolley Problem, 59 PHIL. STUD. 
91 (1990). 
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the trolley crashing into a minivan containing five people.  By opening 
the switch, however, the reader can divert the trolley onto a section of 
track where a railroad employee is performing maintenance, resulting 
in his death.  (As with many fanciful stories in philosophy, it is left 
unexplained precisely how this situation arose, and how the reader 
wound up in the role of trolley switch-attendant.)  In any event, the issue 
is supposed to be clear: do nothing and passively allow the death of five 
people, or act and allow the death of one person while saving five 
others?  If it seems clear that switching the trolley onto the track with 
one potential victim is the right thing to do, would the same principle 
apply to the situation facing a transplant surgeon who needs five organs 
to save five different patients, and who learns that in her hospital is a 
healthy person whose organs happen to be a perfect match for the five 
others otherwise certain to die?3 
Many journalists and other commentators in the popular media 
have been captivated by the trolley problem and its myriad variations 
as they might arise for engineers designing autonomous vehicles.  It has 
been described as “the focus of fierce debate among technologists 
around the world.”4  As an article in Wired puts it, “[p]eople seem more 
than a bit freaked out by the trolley problem right now.”5  The Atlantic 
reported on an ethical-engineering collaboration between Stanford 
University and driverless-car researchers at Google and Tesla using the 
trolley problem as a “useful springboard” for approaching the design of 
decision-making algorithms.6  The problem does not arise only for fully 
autonomous (“driverless”) vehicles,7 but is implicated in semi-
autonomous cars with present-generation technology, such as Tesla’s 
                                                          
3.  Thomson, supra note 1, at 80. 
4.  Alex Hern, Self-Driving Cars Don’t Care About Your Moral Dilemmas, 
GUARDIAN (Aug. 22, 2016). 
5.  Aarian Marshall, Lawyers, Not Ethicists, Will Solve the Robocar “Trolley 
Problem,” WIRED (May 28, 2017). 
6.  See Lauren Cassani Davis, Would You Pull the Trolley Switch? Does it 
Matter?, ATLANTIC (Oct. 9, 2015). 
7.  The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) 
distinguishes among levels of automation based on whether the driver or an automated 
system is primarily responsible for monitoring the driving environment. A vehicle 
may have multiple systems, some of which are highly automated, on NHTSA’s 
definition, others of which are less highly automated. See U.S. DEPT. OF 
TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL AUTOMATED VEHICLES POLICY 11 (Sept. 2016) 
[hereinafter “DOT AV Policy”].  
2
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Automatic Emergency Braking.  Should such a system be programmed 
to take control away from a human driver if the car senses the driver is 
deliberately driving the car toward a group of people?8 The topic has 
generated enough interest that a group of researchers sought to 
determine the preferences of survey respondents regarding an 
autonomous vehicle’s solution to the trolley problem.9  Should the car 
sacrifice one person to save the lives of five others?  What if the one 
person in question is the driver?  Perhaps unsurprisingly, study 
participants’ preferences varied depending on whether they were asked 
to imagine themselves as the driver.  Participants who assumed they 
would be in the driver’s seat were considerably more likely to wish for 
a car that did not make the utility-maximizing calculation that one lost 
life was better than five.  As a result, people may buy fewer self-driving 
cars, failing to mitigate the problem of crashes caused by driver error.10  
Perhaps aware of this finding, a Mercedes-Benz executive stated that if 
faced with the choice between running over a child who unexpectedly 
darted into the road and steering suddenly, causing a rollover accident 
that would kill the driver, an automated Mercedes would opt to kill the 
child.11 
To be sure, not everyone thinking about the design of self-driving 
cars is obsessed with the trolley problem.  A Google engineer working 
on that company’s autonomous-vehicle program noted that if a vehicle 
found itself in the situation of having to choose between “the baby 
stroller or the grandmother” it would mean that there was a mistake a 
few second earlier in the accident sequence; thus, an ethical software 
engineer would concentrate on designing systems that minimize the 
likelihood of getting into a trolley-type dilemma in the first place.12  In 
                                                          
8.  See Patrick Lin, Here’s How Tesla Solves a Self-Driving Crash Dilemma, 
FORBES (Apr. 5, 2017). 
9.  Jean-François Bonnefon, Azim Shariff & Iyad Rahwan, The Social Dilemma 
of Autonomous Vehicles, SCIENCE (June 24, 2016). 
10.  A New York Times article reports that 37,000 people died in car accidents 
last year in the U.S., “most from human error.” David Leonhardt, Driverless Cars 
Made Me Nervous. Then I Tried One, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 22, 2017); see also DOT AV 
Policy, supra note 7, at 5 (estimating that 94% of car accidents are the result of human 
error).  
11.  See David Z. Morris, Mercedes-Benz’s Self-Driving Cars Would Choose 
Passenger Lives Over Bystanders, FORTUNE (Oct. 15, 2016). 
12.  Hern, supra note 4.  
3
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many of these scenarios, the right answer is always “slam on the 
brakes.”13  And, callous as it may sound, even if an automated system 
does occasionally make the wrong call, the net impact on safety is likely 
to be substantially positive given the improvement technology offers 
over error-prone human drivers.14  The first pedestrian death involving 
                                                          
13.  Id.  
14.  Leonhardt, supra note 10. In an otherwise engaging article, the author 
makes a statement that should not go unchallenged: “Technology creates an 
opportunity to save lives . . . . Just look at commercial airlines: Automation has helped 
all but eliminate fatal crashes among American air carriers. The last one happened in 
2009.” Technology has enabled aircraft manufacturers and airlines to engineer out 
risks that formerly contributed to accidents. Examples include Traffic Collision 
Avoidance Systems (“TCAS”), which has all but eliminated the risk of midair 
collisions in terminal-area airspace; Ground-Proximity Warning Systems (“GPWS”), 
which drastically cut down on controlled flight into terrain (“CFIT”) accidents; and 
Predictive Windshear Alerting Systems (“PWS”), which reduced the risk of 
dangerous low-level windshear encounters. Better training for flight crews, 
particularly emphasis on Crew-Resource Management (“CRM”) also played a role in 
reducing risk in commercial aviation. But it is a strongly-held belief in the aviation 
community that automation, as distinct from technology more generally, has created 
new risks of automation dependency that may have offset the reduction in risk 
attributable to automation. Inattention to or lack of proficiency in basic hand-flying 
skills is a contributing factor in several recent accidents, including the crash of Asiana 
Airlines flight #214 at San Francisco International Airport. See NATIONAL 
TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD, ACCIDENT REPORT: DESCENT BELOW VISUAL 
GLIDEPATH AND IMPACT WITH SEAWALL ASIANA AIRLINES FLIGHT 214 (2013), 
https://dms.ntsb.gov/public/55000-55499/55433/563979.pdf. The problem of 
reversion to manual control is also an ever-present issue with automated control 
systems, as is the introduction of different types of programming errors. See generally 
Earl L. Wiener, Cockpit Automation, in HUMAN FACTORS IN AVIATION 433 (Earl L. 
Wiener & David C. Nagel eds., 1988).  
 This is a subject that is of central importance to the design of semi-autonomous 
cars and the liability of manufacturers. A fuller discussion must await a different 
occasion, but for now the point is that automation dependency is regarded as a serious 
risk in commercial aviation and needs to be taken seriously when designing interfaces 
between automated vehicles and human drivers. Curious readers are invited to Google 
“Children of the Magenta Line.” American Airlines training captain Warren 
Vanderburgh coined that term to describe automation-dependent pilots who had 
forgotten that flight-management systems are tools for reducing workload at critical 
phases of flight, not substitutes for good old-fashioned piloting. The video in which 
he describes his experience flying the line with pilots who, quite understandably, had 
become overly dependent on automation is a bona fide classic in the aviation world. 
See, e.g., Editorial, How to End Automation Dependency, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE 
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an autonomous vehicle, in March 2018, in a car conducting testing for 
Uber, did not appear to involve any decision by the car’s software to 
sacrifice the pedestrian’s life to save the driver or others.15  
Nevertheless, it appears that the trolley problem is now firmly 
established as a heuristic for an important normative issue connected 
with the design of autonomous and semi-autonomous vehicles. The 
issue is, what ethical standards should be employed when evaluating an 
engineering decision that plays out in an action taken by the vehicle, as 
opposed to the driver? Should autonomous systems make utility-
maximizing decisions, or should they consider persons in general, or 
specifically the driver, as having inherent value?  The trolley problem 
supposedly bears on this debate, at least to the extent it supposedly 
reveals the intuitions people have concerning the process of ethical 
decision-making. 
II.  AMORAL MACHINES? 
In this paper I would like to make a modest, but pointed, 
intervention in the debate over the trolley problem and autonomous 
vehicles. A researcher at Stanford University recently declared the 
debate had already been concluded by, of all things, the law.16  While 
moral philosophers were busy spinning out fantastic scenarios 
involving runaway trolleys and portly men being pushed off bridges 
(really, this is one variation in the literature),17 lawyers and judges in 
                                                          
TECH. (July 19, 2013) (citing Capt. Vanderburgh’s “famous lecture” on the paradox 
of automation). 
15.  See, e.g., Sam Levin, Video Released of Uber Self-Driving Crash That 
Killed Woman in Arizona, GUARDIAN (Mar. 21, 2018); Heather Somerville et al., 
Uber’s Use of Fewer Safety Sensors Prompts Questions After Arizona Crash, 
REUTERS (Mar. 27, 2018).  
16.  Bryan Casey, Amoral Machines, or: How Roboticists Can Learn to Stop 
Worrying and Love the Law, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 231 (2017).  
17.  See Thomson, supra note 1, at 82-83; DAVID EDMONDS, WOULD YOU KILL 
THE FAT MAN? THE TROLLEY PROBLEM AND WHAT YOUR ANSWER TELLS US ABOUT 
RIGHT AND WRONG 36-38 (2015). Although the stripped-down versions of trolley-
type problems can seem silly, they are intended to track the features of very real moral 
dilemmas. Edmonds’s popular history of the trolley problem begins with Winston 
Churchill’s decision in 1944 to feed disinformation to the Germans which would 
foreseeably result in thousands of deaths in South London (from unguided German 
V-1 “buzz bombs”) but save more lives, and protect government infrastructure, nearer 
to the center of the city. Id. at 1-7. President Harry Truman’s decision to drop atomic 
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tort cases were busily establishing liability principles that answer the 
normative questions facing designers of autonomous vehicles.  In this 
article, entitled Amoral Machines, the author contends that, while 
machine ethicists may fret over the balance of consequentialist and 
deontological considerations that an autonomous system should take 
into account when choosing between the driver and bystanders, 
autonomous-vehicle manufacturers will simply make decisions that 
minimize their exposure to legal liability.18  They will act as the 
proverbial “bad man,” described by O.W. Holmes, Jr., who cares about 
the law not because he believes it has any claim on his allegiance, but 
because he wishes to avoid legal sanctions.19  Those decisions to prefer 
profit over ethics will result in algorithms that ignore negative 
externalities and take into account “only those costs the firm can expect 
to incur.”20  Depending on the applicable liability regime—strict 
liability, for example, as compared with negligence—designers will 
program vehicles differently, but always with the objective of 
minimizing the firm’s liability.  Ethical reasoning, however, is entirely 
beside the point. 
This analysis in Amoral Machines is deeply confused in both 
matters of jurisprudence and tort law.  The Holmesian bad man point of 
view is best understood as a caution not to interpret moralized language 
in the law (such as duty, reasonable care, good faith, and so on) as if it 
had the same meaning in the law as it does in ordinary life.21  In this 
way, it is not a particularly profound insight, but merely a restatement 
of the central claim of legal positivism, that a norm is entitled to be 
called “law” because it was enacted by a particular social process, not 
because it is just or in furtherance of the common good.  However, this 
does not mean that legal norms cannot track or incorporate moral 
principles.  A lawyer would be well-advised to do some research to see 
what reasonable care or good faith requires under applicable legal 
                                                          
bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, with the intention of ending the war early and 
avoiding the deaths of hundreds of thousands of combatants and civilians, has a 
similar structure. Id. at 23-24.  
18.  Casey, supra note 16, at 234. 
19.  Id. at 244 (discussing Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 
HARV. L. REV. 457, 459-62 (1897)). 
20.  Id. at 247.  
21.  See David Luban, The Bad Man and the Good Lawyer, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1547, 1562-63 (1997). 
6
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standards, rather than simply consulting her moral compass.  But it may 
turn out that what is legally required or permitted coincides with what 
is morally required or permitted.  Tort law is full of examples of legal 
duties or privileges that make perfect sense from a moral point of view.  
The famous maxim “danger invites rescue,”22 which is part of the law 
of proximate causation, is also a principle of folk morality: a tortfeasor 
who causes a primary injury is also liable to rescuers, because it is a 
normal human tendency to want to come to the aid of someone in peril.  
Implied assumption of risk cases may turn on an assessment of the 
social value of an activity, as in Judge Cardozo’s entertaining opinion 
concerning the “Flopper” ride on Coney Island.23  The analysis of legal 
duty is often explicitly moralized, as in the Rowland/Tarasoff factors 
employed by the California Supreme Court and picked up in many other 
jurisdictions.24  The common law of punitive damages is replete with 
moral descriptions of the defendant’s conduct as “wanton,” “reckless,” 
“consciously indifferent to the welfare of others,” and is characterized 
by “malice,” “spite,” “ill will,” or even a “disposition of perversity.”25  
                                                          
22.  Wagner v. Int’l Ry., 133 N.E. 437 (N.Y. 1921) (Cardozo, J.). 
23.  Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co., 166 N.E. 173 (N.Y. 1929). See 
generally Kenneth W. Simons, Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co.: While the 
Timorous Stay at Home, the Adventurous Ride the Flopper, in TORTS STORIES 207 
(Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 2003). 
24.  See Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976); 
Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968). For more recent applications, see 
Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified Sch. Dist., 929 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1997). For an 
application of the Rowland/Tarasoff approach by an important state appellate court 
outside of California, see J.S. v. R.T.H., 714 A.2d 924 (N.J. 1998). The California 
duty analysis requires a balancing of multiple considerations, including the 
foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered 
injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant’s conduct and the 
plaintiff’s injury, the moral blameworthiness of the defendant’s conduct, the policy of 
preventing future harm, the insurability of the liability, and the extent of the burden 
on the defendant and, indirectly, to the community as a whole. The California court’s 
approach was at one time so prevalent in the analysis of the duty element that a leading 
torts treatise stated that a court’s determination that a duty exists is nothing more than 
“an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law 
to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection.” W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., 
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 357-58 (5th ed. 1984). 
25.  See, e.g., Owens-Ill., Inc. v. Zenobia, 601 A.2d 633 (Md. 1992); National 
By-Products, Inc. v. Searcy House Moving Co., 731 S.W.2d 194 (Ark. 1987); Taylor 
v. Superior Court, 598 P.2d 854 (Cal. 1979). Unsurprisingly, Richard Posner proposed 
an economic rationale for punitive damages, wearing his hat as an appellate judge, in 
7
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The idea of a separation of law and morality is really a caricature of 
legal positivism, and not in any way an accurate description of the 
relationship between legal and moral considerations. 
This is pretty bland stuff. A more radical reading of Holmes, picked 
up by some law and economics scholars, understands Holmes as 
contending that legal duties are not duties at all, no matter what the law 
says. The language of duty is instead a roundabout way of indicating 
that legislatures or courts have set a certain price on conduct as opposed 
to prohibiting it.26  For example, the likelihood of being ordered to pay 
$250,000 in damages for ruining someone’s reputation does not mean 
that slander is wrong and people should refrain from it; rather, it means 
only that it is an expensive activity.  If one wishes to defame others and 
can afford to pay the price, the law has nothing more to say about the 
matter.27  Amoral Machines appears to be relying on this reading of 
Holmes, but it is decidedly outside the mainstream among legal 
philosophers.  For one thing, the reduction of legal prohibitions to 
prices or taxes cannot explain what would be wrong (if anything) with 
avoiding legal penalties by bribing judges, intimidating witnesses, or 
destroying evidence.  The answer cannot be that those things are wrong, 
because the law-as-price view is supposed to apply to all purported legal 
duties.  Moreover, as H.L.A. Hart pointed out, the radical reading of 
Holmes also fails to account for the fact that many people often treat 
the law as having normative significance.28  That is, it establishes 
reasons for action, independent of any antecedent reasons one may have 
                                                          
an interesting case involving a hotel owner’s indifference to the presence of bedbugs. 
See Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2003). 
26.  See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Antitrust Suits by 
Targets of Tender Offers, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1155, 1168 (1982) (arguing that rational 
corporate managers ought to treat legal norms as a form of price or tax, not an outright 
prohibition); Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Compliance with the Law in the Era of 
Efficiency, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1265 (1998) (describing and criticizing the Easterbrook 
& Fischel position). 
27.  See Williams, supra note 26, at 1268. In fairness to Easterbrook and Fischel, 
they exclude mala in se criminal offenses such as murder and rape, so it is unclear 
what they would say slander. Maybe they think it is intrinsically wrong. In general, 
however, their version of the Holmesian bad man point of view denies that the law 
can actually prohibit anything. Conduct that is wrong in itself remains wrong; the law 
prohibiting the conduct does not change the normative situation of those subject to 
the law.  
28.  See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 56, 82 (2d ed. 1994). 
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had to avoid punishment.29  A theory of law that fits awkwardly at best 
with how the concept of law is used by ordinary folks is unlikely to be 
the right one. 
Here is where the second, and in many ways more important, 
confusion arises.  The author cites Learned Hand’s famous B<PL 
formula from the Carroll Towing case, and alludes briefly to the 
position, developed by Guido Calabresi and Richard Posner, that the 
Hand formula embodies an economic analysis of the negligence 
standard.30  The idea is that an actor compares the expected accident 
losses (PL) that could be prevented by the adoption of a burdensome 
safety feature, practice, or product redesign (B).  If the cost of the 
additional safety precaution exceeds the savings in expected accident 
losses, the additional precaution is wasteful from the social point of 
view.  Aggregate social welfare is maximized at the point at which the 
marginal cost of additional safety precautions is equal to the marginal 
benefit in terms of reduced accident costs.  Never mind that juries are 
never instructed to engage in explicit cost-benefit calculation.31  The 
more substantive problem with the economic reading of the Hand 
formula is that it fails to account for the results in a vast swath of torts 
cases.  Courts simply do not impose liability only where the cost of a 
                                                          
29.  Joseph Raz, Authority, Law, and Morality, in ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC 
DOMAIN 210 (1994). 
30.  Casey, supra note 16, at 242 n.66, 248. The classic Hand-formula case is 
United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). Posner argued that 
Hand had given an economic formulation of the social function of the negligence 
standard, stated concisely: “Discounting (multiplying) the cost of an accident if it 
occurs by the probability of occurrence yields a measure of the economic benefit to 
be anticipated from incurring the costs necessary to prevent the accident.” Richard A. 
Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 32 (1972). The idea is that the 
law should require actors to prevent the accidents that are worth preventing—i.e. 
where the marginal cost of preventing them is less than the expected accident losses 
if a precaution is not taken. The total social cost of accidents, as the sum of prevention 
costs and accident costs, is thereby minimized. To put it differently, the level of 
spending on accident prevention is efficient if courts employ the Carroll Towing 
standard. See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS (1970); see also Guido 
Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 
499 (1961). 
31.  See Patrick J. Kelley & Laurel A. Wendt, What Judges Tell Juries About 
Negligence: A Review of Pattern Jury Instructions, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 587 (2002); 
Stephen G. Gilles, The Invisible Hand Formula, 80 VA. L. REV. 1015 (1994).  
9
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precaution is less than the accident cost savings.32  A whole range of 
other factors comes into the analysis including an ethical assessment of 
the wrongfulness of the defendant’s conduct; the defendant’s duty 
being correlative to the rights of the injured party.  Corrective justice 
and civil recourse theorists have for decades criticized economic 
analysis for failing to account for the centrality of the concept of moral 
wrongfulness in tort law.33  A certain amount of rough, back-of-the-
envelope-risk-utility analysis does go into evaluating when a 
defendant’s conduct falls below the standard of care.  Although juries 
may not be instructed on the Hand formula, reviewing courts will 
sometimes go through an impressionistic risk-utility balance,34 though 
nothing like the kind of formal cost-benefit analysis required by 
administrative law.  In addition to informal balancing, courts also take 
into account a wide range of factors that cannot be reduced to the cost 
of taking a precaution or the expected accident losses foreseeably 
prevented by the adoption of a precaution.  Ordinary moral notions such 
as rights and wrongfulness are pervasive in tort law.35 
Importantly for what will follow, economic analysis is inadequate 
to account for the role played by the principle of responsibility.36  As 
                                                          
32.  See, e.g., Lawrence A. Cunningham, Traditional Versus Economic 
Analysis: Evidence from Cardozo and Posner Torts Opinions, 62 FLA. L. REV. 667 
(2010). 
33.  See, e.g., JULES COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE (2001); Gregory 
Keating, Is the Role of Tort to Repair Wrongful Losses?, in RIGHTS AND PRIVATE LAW 
367 (Donal Nolan & Andrew Robertson eds., 2012); Mark Geistfeld, Economics, 
Moral Philosophy, and the Positive Analysis of Tort Law, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE 
LAW OF TORTS 250 (Gerald J. Postema ed., 2001); David G. Owen, Philosophical 
Foundations of Fault in Tort Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 
201 (David G. Owen ed., 1995); John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts 
as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 917 (2010); Ernest J. Weinrib, The Special Morality of 
Tort Law, 34 MCGILL L.J. 403 (1988). 
34.  See, e.g., Washington v. La. Power & Light Co., 555 So.2d 1350, 1355 (La. 
1990) (noting that the court’s intuitive risk-benefit balancing “is merely a shorthand 
expression of the mental processes involved in such considerations” and that no court 
can “mathematically or mechanically quantify, multiply or weigh risks, losses and 
burdens of precautions.”).  
35.  See Richard W. Wright, The Standards of Care in Negligence Law, in 
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW, supra note 33, at 249; Heidi Li 
Feldman, Prudence, Benevolence, and Negligence: Virtue Ethics and Tort Law, 74 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1431 (2000). 
36.  COLEMAN, supra note 33, at 15. 
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Jules Coleman argues, economic analysis is a forward-looking theory 
of tort law37 that establishes an efficient level of spending on accident 
prevention.  There is no normative significance, in economic analysis, 
to the relationship between a wrongdoer and someone injured as a result 
of the wrongdoers acts or omissions.  It would be a perfectly sensible 
thing to dispense with the category of tort liability altogether, and work 
instead with no-fault accident compensation (as in New Zealand), or a 
public-law idea such as social-risk regulation.38 But we do not do this.  
American tort law is made up of many components parts, some 
substantive, others structural.  There are doctrinal elements such as 
duty, standard of care, factual and proximate causation, and structural 
features such as the bilateral relationship between the plaintiff and the 
defendant, which is so obvious it often goes unnoticed.  As Coleman 
points out, however, a significant feature of our tort system difficult to 
explain by an economic analysis of tort law is the fact that the victim 
sues the injurer, rather than the person who is in the best position to 
prevent accidents.39  A number of misfortunes may befall a person in 
the course of her life. Only some of those misfortunes are legally 
actionable wrongs – that is, torts.  Even on a fairly austere libertarian 
conception of responsibility, misfortunes deemed to be torts have the 
property, at least, of being attributable to human agency.  “Volition and 
causation distinguish doings from mere happenings: actions from other 
events.”40  One may add further conditions, such as a requirement of 
moral or political fairness in the imposition of legal liability.41  But a 
forward-looking explanation, reducing all concepts in tort law to 
accident-cost reduction, fails to make sense of the point and purpose of 
the tort system as it is revealed through its rules and application by 
judges and juries. 
                                                          
37.  See Jules Coleman, Tort Law and Tort Theory: Preliminary Reflections on 
Method, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 33, at 183, 186. 
38.  Coleman, supra note 37, at 196. 
39.  Id. at 188; see also COLEMAN, supra note 33, at 17 (“There is simply no 
principled reason, on the economic analysis, to limit the defendant or plaintiff classes 
to injurers and their respective victims.”).  
40.  Coleman, supra note 37, at 198; see also COLEMAN, supra note 33, at 51 
(“Only agents are the proper objects of responsibility . . . .”).  
41.  Coleman, supra note 37, at 200; see also George P. Fletcher, Fairness and 
Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1972).  
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A fallback position might be to contend that, whatever is true of tort 
law generally, products liability law either is, or ought to be, treated 
differently.  Perhaps products liability is a distinctive domain of tort law 
in which economic values and cost-benefit analysis should 
predominate.  Products liability law is parasitic on underlying tort 
concepts such as reasonableness and causation.  It is not separate from 
torts in any meaningful sense.  One might respond that manufacturers 
are strictly liable for introducing defective products into the stream of 
commerce.  Thus, what may be true of a negligence-based liability 
scheme, including related principles of proximate causation, 
comparative fault, and allocation of damages among jointly responsible 
tortfeasors, may not hold within the domain of strict liability.  Applied 
to autonomous vehicles, principles of strict liability may support the 
Amoral Machines view that manufacturers will make design decisions 
based solely on economic considerations.  This is a mistake, too, but 
one that is understandable in light of the evolution of products liability 
law.  As the next section will explain, courts talked about strict liability 
in early and influential products liability decisions, but as the law 
evolved, the substantive liability rules coalesced around what is 
essentially a negligence standard.  The modern analysis of design-
defect cases, reflected in Section 2(b) of the Third Restatement, is 
mostly indistinguishable from negligence.  That does not mean, 
however, that cases engage in the efficiency analysis suggested by 
Posner’s reading of Carroll Towing.  Design-defect cases are informed 
by a cluster of values related to the utility of the product to the 
consumer, in light of the performance of the product, its safety features, 
and the expectations consumers have with respect to the product.  A 
modern court applying well-developed principles of design-defect 
analysis would engage in a process of ethical decision-making that is 
far from the Holmesian perspective described in Amoral Machines.  To 
make that claim stick, the next section will briefly explain how the law 
of products liability evolved into what it is today. 
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III. FROM NEGLIGENCE TO STRICT LIABILITY AND BACK AGAIN42 
Every first-year law student knows that strict liability for defective 
products coalesced in the early 1960’s, led by influential decisions from 
the California Supreme Court.  New York Court of Appeals Judge 
Benjamin Cardozo’s MacPherson decision had long since liberated 
plaintiffs from the requirement of showing privity of contract in a 
lawsuit against the manufacturer of a defective product, but the 
underlying cause of action was still one for negligence.43  Negligence 
worked tolerably well in some cases, but in others, the plaintiff lacked 
sufficient evidence to show the way in which the manufacturer’s 
conduct fell below the standard of care.  Traditional common-law 
evidentiary doctrines like res ipsa loquitur were helpful to some 
plaintiffs, but as California Supreme Court Justice Roger Traynor 
recognized in an influential concurring opinion, the policy 
considerations that supported relaxing the plaintiff’s evidentiary burden 
would also support recognizing strict liability for product 
manufacturers.44  Manufacturers should be responsible for injuries 
caused by product defects because they are in the best position to 
prevent the hazard, and because the resulting accident losses can be 
shifted and spread over the population of consumers.  The plaintiff is 
typically in a worse position, vis-à-vis the manufacturer, to develop 
evidence through investigation and discovery to show the cause of the 
accident.  This reasoning supports the application of res ipsa, but 
Justice Traynor recognized that a manufacturer is also unlikely to be 
able to introduce evidence sufficient to rebut the inference of 
negligence, and as a result “the negligence rule approaches the rule of 
strict liability.”45  Justice Traynor’s view became the majority position 
in 1962,46 around the time that Professor William Prosser was writing 
                                                          
42.  See Sheila L. Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From 
Negligence [to Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REV. 593 
(1980). 
43.  See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).  
44.  Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, 
J., concurring). 
45.  Id. at 441. 
46.  Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1962). We can 
set aside for present purposes the parallel developments in the law of contract 
warranties, which had also served as a doctrinal hook for plaintiffs to bring products 
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influential law review articles arguing for strict liability for 
manufacturers of defective products.47  Professor Prosser was then 
serving as the Reporter to the American Law Institute’s Second 
Restatement of Torts, and drafted the provision that became Section 
402A.  It provided that anyone who “sells a product in a defective 
condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer” is strictly 
liable for the resulting harm.48 
It did not take courts long to realize the problem lurking in this 
formulation.  A manufacturer’s liability is predicated on the finding of 
a defect in the product or, in the language of the Second Restatement, a 
conclusion that the product is in a defective condition unreasonably 
dangerous to the user.  Not every dangerous product is defective.  I own 
a heavy, sharp 10-inch cook’s knife, which poses a risk to the fingertips 
of an unwary user, but it is not legally defective.  In drafting Section 
402A, Prosser anticipated this issue and included language in the 
commentary that distinguished dangerous products from those that are 
defective: “The article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that 
which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases 
it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its 
characteristics.”49 
My cook’s knife is just as dangerous as an ordinary consumer 
would expect, given common knowledge of its characteristics.  The idea 
seemed to be that a defective product is one that—based on the ordinary 
consumer’s knowledge and expectations—is unreasonably dangerous.  
However, even this interpretation seemed to be a step back from the 
strict liability envisioned by the Second Restatement.  The California 
Supreme Court thought so, and cautioned that courts should not 
                                                          
liability claims against manufacturers. In a watershed case, the New Jersey Supreme 
Court recognized a cause of action for breach of the implied warranty of 
merchantability, but without the usual contract-law limitations of privity and 
disclaimability. The warranty attaches to the product upon sale and would be breached 
by a product that fails to perform as a reasonable consumer would expect. See 
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960). The implied-
warranty heritage of products liability law persists in the form of the consumer-
expectation test for design defect, a subject which will be considered below.  
47.  See William L. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the 
Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791 (1966); William L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the 
Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960). 
48.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
49.  Id. cmt. i. 
14
California Western Law Review, Vol. 55 [2019], No. 1, Art. 3
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol55/iss1/3
FINAL Wendell camera ready (Do Not Delete) 1/2/2019  10:27 AM 
2018]    THE TROLLEY PROBLEM AND AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES  143 
“burden[] the injured plaintiff with proof of an element which rings of 
negligence.”50  Requiring the plaintiff to prove both that a product was 
defective and that the defect rendered the product unreasonably 
dangerous appears to “ring of negligence.”  But the court also 
recognized that manufacturers should not be treated as insurers of their 
products, i.e. subjected to absolute liability, which differs from strict 
liability.51  There must be a limitation beyond which a court will not 
permit a jury to conclude that a manufacturer should be liable.  The 
court believed the proximate cause element would do the necessary 
analytical work, but proximate causation often turns on reasonable 
foreseeability, and the word “reasonable” surely rings of negligence in 
this context as well. 
It became clear in hindsight that the early “ancestor” cases like 
MacPherson and Escola had all dealt with a particular type of defect, 
known in modern law as a manufacturing defect.52  A manufacturing 
defect exists when a particular product (a token of a type, to use 
philosophical language) deviates from the manufacturer’s prototype in 
a way that causes it to fail and harm the plaintiff.  Buick Motor Co., the 
manufacturer in MacPherson, had presumably intended to use wood of 
sufficient strength for the car’s wheel spokes.  Somehow, however, a 
weaker piece of wood was introduced into the manufacturing process, 
and as a result, the spoke failed, causing the car to crash.  Similarly, 
some unknown glitch in the manufacturing process caused the Coke 
bottle in Escola to explode in the plaintiff’s hand; the problem was 
either in the process of the glass bottle manufacturer, Owens-Illinois, or 
the manufacturer of the finished product, Coca-Cola.  Manufacturing 
defect cases are easy to prove.  The plaintiff must show only that the 
product departed from its intended design.53  The manufacturer’s 
prototype will likely be discoverable and, in any event, it is a reasonable 
inference that the manufacturer had not intended the weak wooden 
spoke or the flaw in the bottle that made it susceptible to exploding 
when handled roughly.  Important for tracing the history of so-called 
                                                          
50.  Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 501 P.2d 1153, 1162 (Cal. 1972).  
51.  Id.  
52.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(a) (AM. 
LAW INST. 1998). 
53.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(a) & cmt. c 
(AM. LAW INST. 1998). 
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strict liability, it is entirely appropriate to speak of manufacturing defect 
cases as involving true strict liability.  Once the plaintiff establishes a 
departure from the manufacturer’s specifications and a causal 
connection with her injury, the manufacturer is liable.  The plaintiff 
need not show that the manufacturer failed to use ordinary care.  Proof 
of a design defect never “rings of negligence.” 
The situation is entirely different with respect to design defect 
cases.  The California Supreme Court observed that “[a] defect may 
emerge from the mind of the designer as well as from the hand of the 
workman.”54  That is certainly true.  However, the difference is that the 
defect does not consist of a deviation from the manufacturer’s 
specifications.  Rather, it is the specifications themselves that are 
“defective.”55  But what does this mean?  An obvious example would 
be something like a large, powerful industrial machine that is not 
guarded to prevent the user from inserting a body part into the machine 
while it is operating.56  The challenge in a case like this is to come up 
with a way of evaluating the specifications as defective without either 
(1) recognizing absolute liability or (2) creating a test that “rings of 
negligence.”57  Finding liability regardless of the reasonableness of the 
engineering design choices made by the manufacturer risks going 
beyond strict liability into the imposition of absolute liability.58  The 
manufacturer would then be liable as an insurer; all the plaintiff would 
need to show is a causal connection between her use of the product and 
an injury.59  If the test is, instead, that it would be unreasonable to fail 
to equip the machine with a guard or interlock system, the standard 
                                                          
54.  Cronin, 501 P.2d at 1162.  
55.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(b) & cmt. 
d (AM. LAW INST. 1998). 
56.  See, e.g., Jaramillo v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 906 N.E.2d 387 (N.Y. 2009) 
(involving an “open architecture” box-folding machine lacking an interlock device 
that would shut the machine down if an open space is accessed by the user). 
57.  See John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 
MISS. L.J. 825 (1973). 
58.  See, e.g., Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539 (N.J. 
1982) (imposing liability for failure to warn of risks that, at the time, a reasonable 
manufacturer would not have known).  
59.  See, e.g., Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 435 P.2d 806 (Or. 1967) 
(distinguishing absolute and strict liability). See also Wade, supra note 57, at 828 
(noting that under absolute liability, the manufacturer of a match would be liable for 
anything burned in a fire started by the match).  
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would hark back to the idea of negligence as the failure to use ordinary 
care.  Courts occasionally tried to end-run that objection by claiming 
the design-defect standard did not ring of negligence because 
“negligence focuses on the conduct of the manufacturer while strict 
liability focuses upon the product.”60  That revision of the test in terms 
of the subject of analysis—product versus manufacturer—ran into the 
obvious objection that a finding of a product’s design defect would 
necessarily entail the conclusion that the manufacturer’s conduct fell 
below the standard of care; a reasonable manufacturer would not release 
a product into the market that embodied an unreasonable design.61  
Some courts continued to maintain the fiction that there is a difference 
between scrutinizing the manufacturer’s conduct, which rings of 
negligence, and evaluating the product for whether it is reasonably safe 
or, instead, defective.62 Eventually, however, courts accepted that the 
best resolution of this issue was to emphasize the word “unreasonably” 
in the Second Restatement formulation that liability follows a showing 
that a product is in a defective condition if it is unreasonably dangerous 
to the user.63 
It cannot be overemphasized that there now is a consensus among 
courts and commentators that design-defect analysis does not follow a 
true strict liability approach.64  The Second Restatement test contained 
the seeds of its own collapse.  Liability requires showing a defect, and 
in design cases, that means showing that the product is unreasonably 
dangerous, not simply that an injury was causally connected to the 
product’s design.  The Third Restatement’s approach is to require the 
plaintiff to show the existence of a reasonable alternative design that 
                                                          
60.  Davis v. Globe Mach. Mfg. Co., 684 P.2d 692 (Wash. 1984); see also 
Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 365 N.W.2d 176 (Mich. 1984) (observing that this reframing 
of the question “may have served to confuse, rather than enlighten, jurors”).  
61.  See, e.g., Lecy v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 973 P.2d 1110 (Wash. Ct. App. 
1999).  
62.  See, e.g., Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 810 P.2d 549 (Cal. 
1991) (involving a claim for failure to warn, but presenting the same conceptual 
issue). 
63.  See, e.g., Boatland of Houston, Inc. v. Bailey, 609 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. 1980); 
Barker v. Lull Eng’g Co., 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978). 
64.  See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Achieving Consensus on 
Defective Product Design, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 867 (1998). 
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would have prevented the plaintiff’s injury.65  Significantly, the Third 
Restatement has entirely given up the position that manufacturers are 
subject to strict liability in design cases: 
Assessment of a product design in most instances requires a 
comparison between an alternative design and the product design 
that caused the injury, undertaken from the viewpoint of a reasonable 
person. That approach is also used in administering the traditional 
reasonableness standard in negligence. The policy reasons that 
support use of a reasonable-person perspective in connection with 
the general negligence standard also support its use in the products 
liability context.66 
On the Third Restatement’s risk-utility test, a jury should evaluate 
the plaintiff’s proposed alternative design to determine whether it is a 
reasonable alternative design (a RAD, as it is often called).  A product 
is defective in design if the manufacturer’s failure to incorporate a RAD 
renders the product not reasonably safe.67  The word “reasonable,” 
which undoubtedly rings of negligence, is all over the black-letter test 
and commentary on design defect.  The Third Restatement’s test 
requires the trier of fact to balance the relative advantages and 
disadvantages of the product as designed, as compared with the 
plaintiff’s proposed alternative. It can consider a variety of factors, 
including68: 
• The magnitude and probability of the foreseeable risks of 
harm posed by the manufacturer’s design, including the user’s 
ability to avoid the risk by the use of reasonable care. 
                                                          
65.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(b) (AM. LAW 
INST. 1998). 
66.  Id. cmt. d (citations omitted).  
67.  Id. cmt. f.  
68.  Id. I have paraphrased and elaborated on the Comment f factors in the 
summary in text. In doing so I have referred back to their original source. See Wade, 
supra note 57, at 837-38. I am using bullet points and not numbers because the 
numbering of the Wade factors does not correspond to the presentation of the factors 
in Comment f. Nevertheless, I want to make it clear that the Restatement test is very 
close to that proposed in Wade’s 1973 article. See Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Defining the 
Boundaries of Alternative Design Under the Restatement (Third) of Torts: The Nature 
and Role of Substitute Products in Design Defect Analysis, 63 TENN. L. REV. 329, 
340-43 (1996) (discussing relationship between Wade factors and Third Restatement 
design-defect test).   
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• Consumer knowledge and expectations regarding the product, 
which may have their source in the manufacturer’s marketing 
efforts, may simply be based on ordinary experience and 
knowledge, or may be influenced by the instructions and 
warnings accompanying the product.69 
• The relative advantages and disadvantages of the product as 
designed and as it could have been designed, with 
consideration of the effect of the alternative design on product 
longevity, maintenance, repair, and aesthetics; for example, 
with due consideration for the hassle sometimes created by 
safety features and the natural tendency of users to disable 
those that create a huge headache. 
• The range of consumer choice among products; for example, 
considering the appropriateness of a more dangerous but 
more versatile or useful version of the product intended for 
expert users. 
The design-defect test can arguably be boiled down to one 
consideration stated in an influential law review article: “The 
manufacturer’s ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the product 
without impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive to maintain 
its utility.”70 
On the modern design-defect test, my cook’s knife is not defective 
in design because, although it poses significant foreseeable risks, there 
is no way to eliminate them without impairing the knife’s usefulness.  
A cook’s knife has to be heavy and sharp to perform its function of 
breaking down vegetables.  A dull knife, obviously, would not be very 
useful.  There are kitchen gadgets, such as mandolines and food 
                                                          
69.  One has to be careful here because the open and obvious nature of the 
danger is not a sufficient reason for the manufacturer to avoid making a reasonable 
design change that would reduce the risk. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: 
PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. d, illus. 3 (AM. LAW INST. 1998). There may be cases, 
however, in which the consumer’s knowledge that a product will perform in a 
particular way is a factor that goes into the analysis of whether the manufacturer has 
a duty to incorporate a safety feature. See, e.g., McSwain v. Sunrise Med., Inc., 689 
F. Supp. 2d 835, 842 (S.D. Miss. 2010) (holding that the wheelchair was not defective 
in design for failure to incorporate anti-tip tubes, because plaintiff and his father knew 
of the propensity of wheelchairs to tip backward and had chosen a model without anti-
tip tubes).  
70.  Wade, supra note 57, at 837 (factor #4).  
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processors, that chop and slice vegetables and incorporate additional 
safety features, but they are not as versatile as a cook’s knife, are a 
hassle to clean, and are often more expensive than a serviceable knife.  
Notice that the word “useful” here is not interpreted according to strict 
economic cost-benefit analysis.  The issue is not the economic burden 
to the manufacturer in redesigning the knife.  Rather, the analysis 
focuses on the user’s experience with the product, including its “safety 
aspects . . . the likelihood that it will cause injury and the probable 
seriousness of the injury.”71  Balanced against the safety aspects of the 
product is not just the economic cost of a redesign but all of the 
disutility that would be associated with the design change, as 
considered from the user’s point of view.  The best product is not 
always the safest product once the design—as a whole—is evaluated in 
terms of its utility to the user. 
Granted, the knife case would not involve a redesign but a 
wholesale replacement of the knife with a different sort of tool, such as 
a mandoline.  However, the same analysis applies to a redesigned 
version of essentially the same product.  Guards and interlocks on 
power tools can make them a hassle to use for certain applications.  (I 
have often been tempted to wire shut the “deadman” switch on my lawn 
mower, which turns off the engine when the handle is released, because 
the mower must be restarted every time I have to leave it to pick up a 
stick or rock.)  A canoe that is less likely to tip over may be slower and 
more difficult to paddle.  Old-school automobile passive-restraint 
systems, such as automatic seat belts, drove many car owners spare until 
airbags supplanted the automatic belts.72  Full-coverage body armor for 
law-enforcement officers is hot and restrictive, and may be less 
appealing to officers than vests that leave some gaps in coverage.73  All 
of these examples illustrate the principle that the design-defect analysis 
considers the utility of the user experience, including expected accident 
costs, before and after the proposed redesign.  The product is defective 
in design only if the plaintiff’s proposed alternative is a RAD.  This is 
known as the risk-utility test. 
                                                          
71.  See id. (factor #2).  
72.  See, e.g., Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000) (reviewing 
the history of the Department of Transportation’s Federal Motor Vehicle Safety 
Standard 208, which required manufacturers to equip vehicles with passive restraints 
starting in 1987).  
73.  See Linegar v. Armour of America, Inc., 909 F.2d 1150 (8th Cir. 1990).  
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It is necessary to conclude this historical overview with a brief note 
on a significant controversy in the development of the modern design-
defect test.  During the evolution of the design-defect standard, some 
states adhered to a freestanding consumer-expectation test, in which the 
expectations of consumers regarding product performance is not merely 
a factor to be considered in the risk-utility balance but is dispositive of 
the design-defect analysis.74  In other words, a product was defective if 
it violated the reasonable expectations of consumers regarding its 
performance and safety.  This test can be traced to the parallel 
development of implied warranties of merchantability in contract law, 
as an alternative doctrinal basis for holding the manufacturers of 
defective products liable to consumers.75  It is also rooted in Section 
402A of the Second Restatement in which the “defective condition 
unreasonably dangerous” standard was elaborated in the comments as 
involving “a risk of physical harm to an extent beyond that 
contemplated by the ordinary consumer . . .  with the ordinary 
knowledge about the product’s characteristics.”76 
The trouble with the freestanding consumer-expectation test was 
soon picked up by courts.77  The issue was, not surprisingly, related to 
the word “reasonable.”  The consumer-expectation test cannot be based 
on the actual, subjective expectations of the plaintiff, but on those of a 
hypothetical reasonable consumer.78  But then the question becomes, 
what expectations would a reasonable consumer have regarding product 
safety?  A consumer could reasonably expect a pickup truck to be able 
to run over a one-inch rock without difficulty, but what about a six-inch 
                                                          
74.  See, e.g., Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc., 2001 WI 109, 245 Wis. 2d 
772, 629 N.W.2d 727; Delaney v. Deere & Co., 999 P.2d 930 (Kan. 2000); Potter v. 
Chi. Pneumatic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319 (Conn. 1997). See also Aaron D. Twerski & 
James A. Henderson, Jr., Manufacturer’s Liability for Defective Product Designs: The 
Triumph of Risk-Utility, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 1061 (2009) (providing a review of the 
case law and a defense of the risk-utility standard, by the Reporters to the Third 
Restatement). 
75.  See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960). As a 
doctrinal basis for liability, implied warranty has been merged into the omnibus cause 
of action for defective products, which sounds primarily in tort. See RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. n (AM. LAW INST. 1998). 
76.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
77.  See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 64, at 879-82. 
78.  See, e.g., Campbell v. Gen. Motors Corp., 649 P.2d 224, 233 n.6 (Cal. 
1982). 
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rock?79  When it comes to complex product designs, inevitably 
involving tradeoffs among a number of functional and safety factors, a 
hypothetically reasonable consumer may have no expectations 
whatsoever.  That consideration led the California Supreme Court, in 
an important case, to limit the consumer-expectation test to product 
designs in which ordinary experience is sufficient to permit the trier of 
fact to infer that the product failed to perform as a reasonable consumer 
would expect.80  For example, a bus passenger who was injured in a fall 
was able to establish a design-defect claim using the consumer-
expectation test because ordinary experience is sufficient to permit 
reasonable people to form expectations concerning the location and 
accessibility of handles and “grab bars” on a bus.81  In complex design 
cases, however, neither the plaintiff nor the trier of fact has sufficient 
experience upon which to draw to evaluate whether the product violated 
reasonable expectations of safety and performance.  As with any factual 
issue on which the trier of fact could be aided in understanding the 
evidence or determining a fact at issue, expert testimony may be 
introduced.82  The expert’s opinions will be based on the sorts of 
considerations taken into account by engineers or others who work on 
these product-design issues in the relevant industry.  These 
considerations will generally be those captured in the Third 
Restatement’s risk-utility analysis.  In a case involving complex design 
issues, it is difficult to avoid the collapse of the consumer-expectation 
test into the risk-utility test.83  On the Third Restatement’s analysis, the 
                                                          
79.  Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 435 P.2d 806 (Or. 1967). 
80.  Soule v. Gen. Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298 (Cal. 1994).  
81.  Campbell, 649 P.2d at 224. 
82.  FED. R. EVID. 702.  
83.  In a state purporting to employ the consumer-expectation test, the plaintiff’s 
lawyer quite wisely opted to introduce expert testimony showing the feasibility of a 
design change to pneumatic power tools that allegedly would have prevented the 
neurological impairment to the plaintiff’s hands. The plaintiff, in effect, proved the 
existence of a RAD using the risk-utility test as a kind of tacit background norm. See 
Potter v. Chi. Pneumatic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319 (Conn. 1997). The court paid 
considerable lip service to the consumer-expectation test, but the evidence in the case 
is better understood on a risk-utility framework. Subsequent case law in Connecticut, 
albeit unpublished and at the trial court level, supported this reading of Potter. See 
Gershberg v. Camera Wholesalers, Inc., No. FSTCV126014627S, 2014 WL 1283077 
(Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 26, 2014); Brierley v. Haas, No. WWMCV126005937S, 2014 
WL 7714329 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 18, 2014). Then the Connecticut Supreme Court 
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expectations of consumers regarding the product are a factor to be taken 
into account in design-defect litigation, but are not by themselves 
dispositive of the issue.84 
IV. THE MORALITY OF DESIGN-DEFECT ANALYSIS 
With this overview in modern products liability law, we can turn to 
the critique of the Amoral Machines thesis that autonomous vehicle 
manufacturers do not need to engage in ethical decision-making 
because the legal system has already resolved all of the relevant 
questions.  The article sets up a classic trolley-type problem by 
imagining that the vehicle’s software must instantaneously choose 
between running into five teenagers or engaging in a sudden evasive 
maneuver that will cause the car to overturn, killing its occupant.85  On 
the “amoral” analysis, the resolution of the dilemma is that the car 
should avoid the teenagers, even if it results in the death of the driver.  
The first mistake in the analysis is to assume that the manufacturer will 
be strictly liable for the deaths of the teenagers, regardless of fault.86  
As explained in the previous Section, that is a complete mis-description 
of the governing liability standard.  It confuses strict liability with 
absolute liability, which was never imposed.87  Even in the early days 
                                                          
“modified” Potter (but really just clarified what had been implicit in the case all along, 
in my view) in a lengthy opinion. See Izzarelli v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 136 
A.3d 1232 (Conn. 2016). 
84.  For a good illustration of the role of consumer expectations in modern 
design-defect analysis, see Bourne v. Marty Gilman, Inc., 452 F.3d 632 (7th Cir. 
2006). See also Vautour v. Body Masters Sports Indus., Inc., 784 A.2d 1178 (N.H. 
2001) (explaining that the Second Restatement requirement of showing that a product 
is unreasonably dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by 
an ordinary consumer is analyzed using a risk-utility balancing test).  
85.  Casey, supra note 16, at 242-43.  
86.  Id. at 243.  
87.  Going the other direction, the article also contends that if the teenagers were 
careless, they would be completely barred from recovery by the defense of 
contributory negligence. See id. at 243. Although a few U.S. jurisdictions continue to 
maintain contributory negligence as a complete defense, the overwhelming majority 
has moved to a rule in which the plaintiff’s recovery is reduced in proportion to the 
share of responsibility allocated to the plaintiff by the trier of fact, but not barred 
completely. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 
7 & Reporters’ Note (AM. LAW INST. 2000). Even in the few remaining true 
contributory-negligence (complete bar) jurisdictions there may be common-law 
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of products liability, when Section 402A of the Second Restatement 
was the applicable standard, a manufacturer would be held liable only 
for injuries caused by a defective vehicle.88  Liability under Section 
402A required a finding that the car was in a “defective condition 
unreasonably dangerous,” which is not strict liability at all, but a kind 
of crypto-negligence standard.  If the vehicle was not defective in 
design, then the manufacturer would not be liable, regardless of the 
causal connection between the design choices that went into the 
software and the deaths of the teenagers. 
Fast-forwarding to the modern standard of the Third Restatement, 
Section 2(b), the question today would be whether the plaintiffs—here, 
the families of the teenagers killed by the car—can show that a 
reasonable alternative design (RAD) would have prevented the 
accident, and that the car was unreasonably dangerous due to the 
omission of the alternative design.89  The plaintiff’s proposed 
alternative design presumably would have been a different decision-
making algorithm that would have swerved to avoid the teenagers, 
resulting in the death of the driver.  Would it be a RAD?  To answer 
that question, the trier of fact would be permitted to consider the factors 
set out above, developed from decades of caselaw and scholarly 
commentary.  At this point, we can set aside the jurisprudential issue 
raised by the Holmesian bad man point of view.  Amoral Machines 
contends that a profit-maximizing manufacturer will make product-
design decisions based solely on the content of legal liability rules, not 
ethical principles: 
Robotics systems of the future will undoubtedly make decisions of 
immense ethical import. But their decisionmaking will be guided less 
                                                          
doctrines such as last clear chance that ameliorate the harsh effects of the rule. See id. 
§ 3. Thus, the claim in the article that the causal contribution of the teenagers’ 
behavior is sufficient to preclude their recovery is wildly inaccurate. In most 
jurisdictions the factfinder would be required to assign a percentage of responsibility 
for the accident to the teenagers, based on a comparison between their risk-creating 
conduct and that of the auto manufacturer. See id. § 8. In the minority of contributory 
negligence states, the factfinder would first have to determine whether the teenagers 
had been negligent (although this was stipulated in the hypothetical) and, if so, 
whether an exception such as last clear chance applies.  
88.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
89.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(b) (AM. LAW. 
INST. 1998). 
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by the vagaries of “conscience” than by the “prophesy” of profit. 
These robots will view the world not as good moral philosophers, but 
as bad men – concerned less with idealized “ethical rule[s]” than with 
the legal rules that dictate whether their firms will face public 
sanction. And those that are instead engineered to follow “a clear and 
consistent” moral code will behave irrationally under a legal code 
lacking both such qualities.90 
Whatever one thinks about the Holmesian bad man perspective 
generally, it should be clear that if the governing liability regime 
permits a court to impose liability on the ground that the manufacturer’s 
design decisions do not embody the right ethical stance with respect to 
consumers, then a purely profit-maximizing manufacturer would seek 
to predict and respond to the ethical reasoning that a judge or jury is 
likely to employ.  And it should also be clear that the factors set forth 
in Comment f to Section 2, the Wade article from which they are 
derived,91 and the voluminous caselaw applying the risk-utility test that 
the applicable liability standard does not sidestep the ethical issue.  In 
fact, it poses it squarely. 
Amoral Machines further asserts that “[s]ystems optimized for 
profit will not fret over negative externalities, but only those costs the 
firm can expect to incur.”92  It is not much of an exaggeration to say 
that, on the law and economics account, the entire point of tort law is to 
force a profit-maximizing firm to internalize negative externalities as a 
way of incentivizing it to determine whether they could be avoided, at 
lesser cost, through the adoption of a safety precaution or product 
redesign.93  Thus, a manufacturer had better fret over negative 
                                                          
90.  Casey, supra note 16, at 244-45.  
91.  See Wade, supra note 57.  
92.  Casey, supra note 16, at 248. Note that this sentence makes a factual claim 
about what manufacturers will do, not what they ought to do. One long-standing 
criticism of economic analysis is that whatever methodological merit there is in 
making simplifying behavioral assumptions about human motivation, a further 
normative argument is necessary to support the conclusion that people ought to 
behave as self-interested utility maximizers. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Is Wealth a 
Value?, in A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 237 (1985). For present purposes, however, I am 
willing to bracket this issue because it is quite clear that applicable legal standards 
require the manufacturer to engage in ethical reasoning, if only to predict and thereby 
minimize its exposure to legal liability.  
93.  See, e.g., LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 
102-03 (2002) (explaining that the optimal liability rule is the one that minimizes the 
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externalities because the applicable liability rule may shift those costs 
to the manufacturer.  The issue is, of course, when the design-defect test 
shifts the costs of injuries to the manufacturer.  The analysis begins with 
our old friend, the reasonable person.  The Third Restatement is 
perfectly clear that the evaluative standpoint from which design-defect 
claims are to be evaluated is the same as the perspective from which 
negligence claims are considered: 
Assessment of a product design in most instances requires a 
comparison between an alternative design and the product design 
that caused the injury, undertaken from the viewpoint of a reasonable 
person. That approach is also used in administering the traditional 
reasonableness standard in negligence. The policy reasons that 
support use of a reasonable-person perspective in connection with 
the general negligence standard also support its use in the products 
liability context.94 
                                                          
sum of accident costs and precaution costs); WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. 
POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 6-9 (1987) (summarizing the 
economic theory of torts as a mechanism for internalizing social costs). 
94.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. d 
(AM. LAW INST. 1998) (citation omitted). The “in most instances” proviso in this 
Comment refers to the quite rare category of cases in which the plaintiff can establish 
defective design without introducing evidence of a RAD. Those cases are mostly 
limited to so-called manifestly unreasonable designs, which present a low social 
utility and a high degree of danger. See id. cmt. e. The standard example is an 
exploding joke cigar, for which no redesign is available that would provide the same 
prank characteristics without the risk of causing burns to the consumer. See id., Illus. 
5. A few cases have applied the manifestly unreasonable design category to less 
obviously ridiculous products, such as above-ground swimming pools. See, e.g., 
O’Brien v. Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298 (N.J. 1983). The majority approach, however, 
is illustrated by a case involving a backyard trampoline. See Parish v. Jumpking, Inc., 
719 N.W.2d 540 (Iowa 2006). In that case, the plaintiff did not offer proof of an 
alternative design but instead relied on the “manifestly unreasonable” category. The 
court cited Comment d to the Third Restatement, Section 2, which states that many 
common and widely distributed products, such as firearms, alcoholic beverages and, 
contra the previously cited O’Brien case, above-ground swimming pools, are 
dangerous and cannot be redesigned. However, quoting one of the Reporters to the 
Third Restatement, it limited the category of manifestly unreasonable designs to those 
in which a trier of fact would conclude that the product was “so bad, so very out loud 
bad, so very antisocial, that it would tug against the very grain of the way [the 
factfinder] was raise.” See id. at 544 (quoting James A. Henderson, Jr., The Habush 
Amendment: Section 2(b) comment e, 8 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 86 (1998)). 
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Now we have come full circle, back to the claim that the negligence 
standard, formulated in terms of what a reasonable person would do, 
can be reduced without distorting the economic cost-benefit analysis.  
As noted above, a reduction of the reasonable person standard to a 
literal application of the Carroll Towing B<PL formula is an inaccurate 
description of the way judges instruct juries to apply the negligence 
standard.95  It seems extremely unlikely that juries instructed only very 
generally, and understood as applying community moral values,96 
would consider only the comparison between expected accident cost 
savings and the expense to the defendant of the untaken precaution. 
Rather than focusing on the reasonable person standard in 
negligence, which has been debated since time immemorial, we can 
look more specifically at design-defect cases arising relatively recently 
after courts worked through the puzzles created by the formulation of 
the Second Restatement’s test in Section 402A.  Imagine two rival 
designs for a system of sensors, software algorithms, and control 
linkages incorporated into a semi-autonomous vehicle.  Each design 
would deal differently with the same foreseeable situation.  The 
situation is a car rounding a blind curve and suddenly happening upon 
a stalled vehicle with five occupants.  The car’s speed is such that it 
cannot stop in time to avoid a rear-end collision with the stalled vehicle.  
However, it has the option of swerving to the right, onto a sidewalk, at 
the cost of running over a pedestrian.  Having foreseen this situation, 
engineers working for the automobile manufacturer have considered 
two rival designs, called Utilitarian and Deontological, each of which 
is technologically feasible.97  (These names are problematic, for reasons 
to be discussed below.)  The decision principle built into Utilitarian 
algorithms is to choose the action that will increase the total happiness 
of all persons (or sentient beings, if one wishes to modify the problem 
to involve a dog on the sidewalk).98  The Deontological design involves 
                                                          
95.  See Kelley & Wendt, supra note 31; Gilles, supra note 31. 
96.  See, e.g., Catharine Wells, Tort Law as Corrective Justice: A Pragmatic 
Justification for Jury Adjudication, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2348 (1990). 
97.  The feasibility of an alternative design is a separate issue from whether the 
alternative design embodies a superior net balance of safety and utility. See, e.g., 
Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463, 468 (7th Cir. 1984). 
98.  See, e.g., J.J.C. Smart, An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics, in 
UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST 3, 30 (J.J.C. Smart & Bernard Williams eds., 
1973). For present purposes we can set aside the considerable disagreement within 
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a somewhat more complex decision-making algorithm. Essentially, it 
boils down to regarding every potentially affected person as having 
intrinsically important rights and refusing to permit the vehicle to 
interfere with someone’s rights as a means of promoting the greater 
good.99  As a result, the rights of a bystander may function as a side 
constraint on the algorithm100 and, consequently, considering an option 
to intentionally swerve and kill the pedestrian may be ruled out. 
Why do the five occupants of the stalled vehicle not have similar 
rights?  Here is where the act/omission distinction or the notion of moral 
luck may be invoked; the presence of the stalled vehicle is taken as a 
given unless the causal sequence of events is altered by an active 
intervention of the car’s automatic systems.  To put it differently, 
negative duties (to refrain from killing) are more stringent than positive 
duties (to act in ways that prevent foreseeable harms).101  The crash that 
kills five people may be preferred because it was not causally connected 
                                                          
consequentialist moral theory concerning issues such as what is to be maximized 
(pleasure, preference satisfaction, or something else); whether outcomes should be 
evaluated by averages or aggregates; the relevance of distributional considerations, 
such as whether one ought to make the ex ante worst off individual better off; whether 
actions, rules, or something else should be evaluated for rightness; and whether one’s 
duty with respect to the good is to maximize it or merely aim at a certain value 
threshold. See, e.g., David O. Brink, Some Forms and Limits of Consequentialism, in 
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ETHICAL THEORY 380 (David Copp ed., 2006). We can 
also ignore the substantial practical problem of establishing an average value of the 
wrongful-death and survival claims asserted by the foreseeable victims. In the real 
world it makes a great deal of difference whether the defendant kills someone with 
substantial future earnings rather than a person working in a relatively low-earnings 
occupation. See KENNETH R. FEINBERG, WHAT IS LIFE WORTH?: THE INSIDE STORY 
OF THE 9/11 FUND AND ITS EFFORT TO COMPENSATE THE VICTIMS OF SEPTEMBER 
11TH (2006). There is also the gruesome but inevitable question of whether the victim 
died instantly or suffered prolonged, conscious agony prior to death. Many 
jurisdictions allow compensation for noneconomic damages resulting from conscious, 
pre-death pain and suffering. See David W. Leebron, Final Moments: Damages for 
Pain and Suffering Prior to Death, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 256 (1989). These 
considerations would make a difference to the behavior of even the strictest 
Holmesian amoral profit-maximizer but would be very difficult to account for ex ante 
in the design of autonomous vehicles.   
99.  See, e.g., Amartya Sen, Rights and Agency, in CONSEQUENTIALISM AND ITS 
CRITICS 187 (Samuel Scheffler ed., 1988). 
100.  See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 28-30 (1974) 
(adopting Nozick’s formulation of the function of rights). 
101.  FOOT, supra note 1; Thomson, supra note 1, at 81. 
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to an intentional act of the system—it was a mere happenstance from 
the point of view of the judgment the software had to make. 
A manufacturer attempting to predict its legal liability as a result of 
adopting one of the rival designs would go through the analysis of 
Section 2(b) of the Third Restatement, which asks whether the expected 
accident losses could be reduced or eliminated by the adoption of a 
RAD.  Note that the Holmesian bad man point of view, in which the 
manufacturer cares only about legal liability, does not necessarily favor 
one of the rival designs over the other.  If Utilitarian is a RAD for 
Deontological, then a Holmesian “bad manufacturer” might incorporate 
as a default option the taking of the pedestrian’s life.  If, however, 
Deontological is a RAD for Utilitarian, because the applicable liability 
rule places central importance on the rights of potential victims, then 
the decision-making algorithm would reach the opposite result.  It is 
also extremely important to notice at this point that the comparison 
between the rival designs is not straightforwardly consequentialist.  Not 
only would this analysis beg the question against the Deontological 
alternative, but it is not faithful to the factors underlying the RAD 
analysis in Section 2.  The reasonableness term of the RAD analysis is 
not simply whether one life, instead of five lives, would foreseeably be 
lost as a result of the adoption of one design.  If the reasonableness 
analysis is best understood as a principle of corrective justice, it may be 
the case that the applicable liability rule requires manufacturers to 
design autonomous vehicle systems to avoid violating rights, even at 
the cost of allowing harms to befall others.  The vehicle’s systems do 
not kill the five victims—they are merely allowed to die.  However, this 
seems like a conception of rights that a corrective justice theorist need 
not accept.  As Judith Jarvis Thomson puts it, “there is no prima facie 
duty to refrain from interfering with existing states of affairs just 
because they are existing states of affairs.”102  Rights being correlative 
with duties, the five occupants of the stalled vehicle may have a right 
to demand that the autonomous vehicle’s systems redirect it into the 
pedestrian.  As Thomson argues in another article about the trolley 
problem, no violation of rights is involved by an agent’s redirection of 
an existing threat so that it takes one life rather than five.103  The 
vehicle’s control software would be changing the path of a threat that 
                                                          
102.  Thomson, supra note 1, at 84. 
103.  Id. at 107-09. 
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arose exogenously to the vehicle’s systems; it would not be creating a 
new threat and directing it at the pedestrian. 
V. DESIGN-DEFECT LITIGATION IN THE REAL WORLD 
Whatever one thinks of the attempts by Thomson and others to 
respond to trolley-type thought experiments, two points bear emphasis.  
The first is that the interesting ethical questions related to the trolley 
depend on much more than the number of potential victims.  The 
transplant-surgeon and fat man variations on the trolley problem 
demonstrate that while the first level of analysis of the problem is about 
rights versus utility, one cannot avoid dealing with deeper questions 
relating to the nature of rights, the relevance of intentions, and the 
relationship between the agent and the victim.104  Why might it be 
morally permissible for a bystander to turn the trolley onto the side 
track, with the foreseeable result of the death of a single person, while 
it would not be permissible for a transplant surgeon to harvest the 
organs of a healthy person to save the lives of five others?  This is a 
hard question if one thinks it is a fundamental principle of ethics that 
all persons are of equal importance.105  Regarding only strictly 
impersonal, impartial values as a source of ethical reasons fails to 
account for the intuitive differences between the original trolley case 
and the transplant-surgeon variation.  Philippa Foot’s article that 
introduced the trolley problem to ethics relies on the traditional 
principle of double effect.106  Thomas Nagel similarly relies on the 
agent’s intention to explain the idea that one should not kill one person 
even to prevent a number of other foreseeable deaths.107  On Nagel’s 
account, deontological reasons tell us not to aim at evil as a means to a 
good end.108  The moral quality of an agent’s actions depends on the 
agent’s intentions, not the foreseeable, but not desired, results.  That 
                                                          
104.  See, e.g., THOMAS NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE (1986). 
105.  See id. at 171. 
106.  FOOT, supra note 1, at 19-21.  
107.  NAGEL, supra note 104, at 178.  
108.  Nagel follows Foot in thinking that the doctrine of double effect is the best 
solution to the trolley problem. See id. at 179-82. 
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means that one cannot do the right thing in the wrong way.109  Put 
simply, the issue is not numbers but the content of mental states. 
The second point follows from the first: it would be a significant 
challenge for software designers and other engineers to handle a trolley-
type scenario in the right way—that is to say, reasonably.  It seems 
fairly straightforward to implement the Utilitarian design.  Systems 
must detect the number of people threatened by alternative courses of 
action and choose the action which produces the greatest savings in 
expected accident losses.110  Suppose the family of the pedestrian 
selected for death by the autonomous systems sues the manufacturer of 
the vehicle claiming the vehicle with Utilitarian algorithms is defective 
in design.  Assuming reasonable minds could differ, the trier of fact will 
be instructed to determine whether omission of the Deontological 
algorithm renders the vehicle not reasonably safe.111  This is an open-
ended inquiry including not only factors such as the foreseeable risks 
of harm, but also the expectations arising from product portrays and 
marketing, the utility of the product to the user, and the overall safety 
of the product.112  The bottom line of the design-defect analysis is that 
the plaintiff must demonstrate that the harm—here, the death of the 
pedestrian—was reasonably preventable.113 
Thinking from the perspective of a juror deciding the issue, there 
does seem to be something sinister about autonomous systems altering 
the path of a vehicle to aim directly at a pedestrian.  Some jurors may 
have a Kantian intuition that the pedestrian is being used merely as a 
                                                          
109.  See BARBARA HERMAN, Integrity and Impartiality, in THE PRACTICE OF 
MORAL JUDGMENT 23 (1993). 
110.  It should also be noted that an autonomous decision-making system would, 
by necessity, be insensitive to some particular features of a situation. For example, a 
computer would have no way of knowing if the pedestrian is related to the driver. The 
object of ethical analysis is therefore likely to be the rules by which the autonomous 
system determines what the vehicle should do. In the language of ethical theory, the 
analysis of the vehicle designer’s choices would likely be a form of indirect 
consequentialism, in which the value of alternative courses of action is assessed in 
terms of “the values of the rules of motives under which the action can be subsumed.” 
Brink, supra note 98, at 384.  
111.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. f (AM. 
LAW INST. 1998). 
112.  Id.  
113.  Id.  
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means to the end of saving the lives of the five,114 and thus, the 
pedestrian’s sacrifice is unreasonable.  (For Kant, what it means to be 
reasonable is to serve the objectively grounded end of the welfare of 
others, because it is a duty to do so.115)  In response, the software 
designers could appeal to the doctrine of double effect, which regards 
the pedestrian’s foreseeable death as a regrettable means to the good 
end of saving five lives.  The decision-making software did not have an 
evil intention, even though it intentionally redirected the path of the car 
knowing it would kill the pedestrian.  However, this response would 
fail to account for the intuition that an autonomous system should 
sacrifice the five occupants of the stalled vehicle, if necessary, to protect 
the driver of the car.116  In the lingo of moral philosophy, the identity 
of the foreseen-but-not-intended victim, whose welfare will be 
sacrificed to save five others, gives rise to an agent-relative reason for 
the driver to prefer his own welfare, but not an agent-neutral reason 
which would apply to everyone impartially.117  Should the driver’s 
agent-relative considerations be taken into account by the systems’ 
designers, or should they be impartial (agent-neutral) among the 
welfare of all potentially affected individuals?  The question of 
                                                          
114.  See CHRISTINE M. KORSGAARD, Kant’s Formula of Humanity, in 
CREATING THE KINGDOM OF ENDS 106 (1996). 
115.  Id. at 107-08. 
116.  Jean-François Bonnefon, Azim Shariff & Iyad Rahwan, The Social 
Dilemma of Autonomous Vehicles, SCIENCE (June 24, 2016). 
117.  The idea is that agent-relative, or subjective reasons belong only to the 
agent. I have reasons to favor my own interest, and the interests of my family and 
friends, which are distinctively my reasons. Others have reasons not to harm my 
children—these are agent-neutral reasons, grounding negative duties—but I have 
agent-relative reasons others do not share to promote the welfare of my children. See, 
e.g., Brink, supra note 98, at 383. This is a fairly standard distinction in modern moral 
philosophy, although its centrality for ethics has been questioned in an influential 
article resisting the claim that all ethical value must ultimately be agent-neutral. See 
CHRISTINE M. KORSGAARD, The Reasons We Can Share: An Attack on the Distinction 
Between Agent-Relative and Agent-Neutral Values, in CREATING THE KINGDOM OF 
ENDS 275 (1996). The decision of Mercedes-Benz, mentioned at the beginning of the 
article, to program an autonomous vehicle to kill a child who darted into the road as a 
means of preventing a rollover accident that would take the life of the vehicle’s driver, 
is an example of agent-relative reasoning in action. See Morris, supra note 11. Agent-
relative reasons are not absolute, however, and it may still be an open question 
whether the lives of two, three, or more bystanders could permissibly be sacrificed to 
save the driver’s life.  
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reasonableness thus conceals an issue of deep interest to moral 
philosophers concerning the types of reasons from which ethical 
decision-making should proceed. 
The defendant in a design-defect case is the manufacturer, which in 
most cases (likely all cases involving mass-marketed automobiles) is a 
corporation.  The identity of the defendant creates a conceptual 
difficulty in the application of ethical concepts such as agent-relative 
reasons, the doctrine of double effect, and the prohibition on aiming at 
evil.  One may wonder how a jury is supposed to assess the intentions 
of a corporation, which is capable of legal responsibility but is not a 
natural person.  “How do [jurors] determine whether a group has intent 
or responsibility when those very terms are usually associated with 
individual, sentient human beings?”118  One answer is that jurors do not 
assess the intention of a fictional person, but the mental state of specific 
human beings such as designers and engineers.119  Presumably, a 
plaintiff’s lawyer could depose the lead systems-integration or software 
engineer who worked on an autonomous vehicle design to determine 
that person’s intentions regarding a trolley-type scenario.  But even that 
inquiry would not reveal whether the victim should be regarded as a 
regrettable side-effect of a morally permissible intention, thereby 
exonerating the manufacturer from liability.  Sophisticated critics of 
utilitarianism emphasize the importance of the agent’s integrity, 
understood as a commitment to a distinctive set of projects and 
relationships.120  It is not an exaggeration to say that the trolley problem 
was invented and developed to focus on the character of these 
deontological reasons.  Jurors would have no choice but to ascribe them 
to a human engineer or to an autonomous system because otherwise 
there is no way of making sense of the idea of acting reasonably.  
Intention is inescapable in ethical reasoning.121 
                                                          
118.  VALERIE P. HANS, BUSINESS ON TRIAL: THE CIVIL JURY AND CORPORATE 
RESPONSIBILITY 79 (2000).  
119.   Id. at 85 (noting that jurors tend to focus on specific individuals rather 
than the missing corporate “person”).  
120.  See, e.g., KORSGAARD, supra note 117, at 282; NAGEL, supra note 104, at 
168; Bernard Williams, Persons, Character, and Morality, in MORAL LUCK 1 (1981).  
121.  An additional complication is suggested by research showing that people’s 
intuitions concerning the intentions of others—which presumably would be directly 
implicated in a design-defect case in which the intentions of the manufacturer’s 
employees would be at issue—are influenced by the moral goodness of the outcome. 
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That reasoning task would be required unless one fell back on the 
utilitarian strategy of relying on a simplistic tally of foreseeable victims 
associated with two or more options.122  This is not only impoverished 
ethical reasoning,123 it is also a gross misinterpretation of the Third 
Restatement design-defect standard.  The ultimate issue in contention 
in a design-defect case is whether the product embodies a reasonable 
balance between safety, including the protection of third parties, and 
utility to the consumer.  There is no algorithm for making this 
determination.  As long as there is sufficient evidence to create a triable 
issue of fact, the jury must balance factors such as the feasibility of an 
alternative design, the likelihood and gravity of expected harm, and the 
disadvantages of the plaintiff’s proposed alternative design.124  The 
number of potential victims associated with different branches in the 
decision tree is a factor to be considered as an advantage or 
disadvantage of the plaintiff’s proposed alternative design, but it is not 
                                                          
See Joshua Knobe, The Concept of Intentional Action: A Case Study in the Uses of 
Folk Psychology, in EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY 129 (Joshua Knobe & Shaun 
Nichols eds., 2008). For example, the judgment of whether an actor is said to have 
brought about a side effect intentionally is influenced by whether the side effect is 
good or bad. Id. at 133. In the Mercedes case, referenced supra note 11, a jury might 
determine that the car’s action of killing a child who accidentally wandered into the 
road is wrong, and, thus, the manufacturer’s design decision was unreasonable, even 
though the car acted to save the driver’s life. Why? Because the child’s death is a bad 
outcome. This is not conclusive of the ethical analysis. People may be mistaken, and 
their intuitive response may be subject to criticism. The extent to which experimental 
evidence should matter to moral philosophers is a currently a contested issue, 
particularly given the perennial question of how one is to derive an “ought” from an 
“is.” See Joshua Knobe & Shaun Nichols, An Experimental Philosophy Manifesto, in 
EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY, supra, at 3, 10; Kwame Anthony Appiah, Experimental 
Philosophy, in EXPERIMENTAL ETHICS: TOWARD AN EMPIRICAL MORAL PHILOSOPHY 
7, 15-16 (Christoph Luetge et al. eds., 2014). Outside of philosophy, however, 
whether they are fully committed Holmesian bad men or not, trial lawyers would 
presumably be quite interested to know how jurors actually apply the concept of 
intentional action.  
122.  See KORSGAARD, supra note 117, at 283 (noting the familiar strategy of 
dismissing deontological considerations and “castigat[ing] people who spend their 
time on worthless activities as irrational”).  
123.  See Bernard Williams, A Critique of Utilitarianism, in UTILITARIANISM: 
FOR AND AGAINST, supra note 98, at 77, 99 (criticizing utilitarianism not for giving 
the wrong answer in a case like this, but for believing that it is obvious what the right 
answer should be).  
124.  See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Jury Instr. § 1204. 
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dispositive.  A jury might believe it is obvious that an autonomous 
vehicle’s systems should steer it toward a single bystander to save five 
others but may also believe that it is wrong to program a vehicle to 
deliberately take the life of a bystander to avoid a greater number of 
deaths.  Nothing in the law of liability for design defects precludes 
either of these conclusions. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Far from putting an end to the ethical dilemmas potentially 
encountered by autonomous vehicles, the law requires manufacturers to 
engage in ethical reasoning, even if they do not want to.  The design-
defect standard calls upon the jury to consider whether the 
manufacturer’s design choices were reasonable.  Despite the best efforts 
of law and economic theorists, the reasonableness inquiry cannot be 
reduced to economic cost-benefit analysis along the lines of Richard 
Posner’s interpretation of the Carroll Towing formula.  Design-defect 
analysis does involve balancing expected harms and utilities, but these 
quantities cannot necessarily be measured in dollar terms. The 
functionality, usefulness, aesthetics, and headaches associated with 
safety features are all part of the risk-utility analysis, even for relatively 
simple products.  When it comes to a complex semi- or fully 
autonomous vehicle with integrated sensor, control, and decision-
making systems, a wide range of factors will inform the reasonableness 
analysis.  One hopes that trolley-type situations will be extremely rare, 
and that automated systems will be able to intervene farther back in the 
accident sequence to avoid the necessity of choosing between one life 
and many.  If it comes down to it, however, the decision procedure 
embodied in the vehicle’s software may determine who lives and who 
dies.  That decision will be evaluated by ordinary people, acting as 
judges and juries, using whatever resources bear on the question of 
reasonableness.  This is not an amoral domain at all, but a richly 
moralized one.  Even manufacturers who are concerned only with 
minimizing their exposure to legal liability should think through the 
ethical issues presented in these unusual cases. 
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